Introduction ¶1 "Politics, " claimed Otto von Bismarck, "is the art of the possible. " 1 A corollary could be that in politics, uniform (or near-uniform) consensus makes anything possible. The swift passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) proves this statement. 2 Introduced in the Senate on July 29, 2015, it was passed less than a year later-clearing the Senate on April 4, 2016 and the House on April 27, 2016-and was signed into law shortly thereafter, on May 11, 2016, by then President Barack Obama. 3 This was brisk progress for such significant legislation in a ¶7 The national approach to a problem so often described as international, on its face may seem puzzling. Testimony by members of Congress and those in industry admitted that the focus of the ultimate legislation was not on traditional industrial espionage or cyberespionage committed by international actors, but on "rogue employees. " 19 For example, a representative of the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly discussed a typical scenario that federal civil trade secret legislation would be meant to remedy:
We often run into situations where we find that an ex-employee has left and is going to work for a competitor, and we find out something such that once they turn in their Lillyissued computer, there has been a download of a number of documents which contain highly confidential Lilly trade secrets. These occurrences almost always happen on a late Friday afternoon, and, therefore, the best part, I believe, about the ex parte seizure aspect of the bill that is currently pending is the fact that we could go to Federal court and in one action kick out an ounce of prevention rather than worrying about a pound of cure a week or two later, when we can get the Indiana State courts involved or the New Jersey State courts involved or perhaps both the Indiana and New Jersey State courts involved, leading to a whole lot more expense if we have to go through State court, a whole lot more risk because we may not be able to isolate and seize the stolen materials as quickly; and, therefore, a Federal cause of action where we can go to a single court and institute the power of the Federal court system to seize stolen materials would be extraordinarily helpful in those situations. 20 The foreign impact of the bills was documented by its supporters to be more indirect. They argued that such legislation would set a "gold standard" of trade secret protection, which could then be injected into trade agreements or used to convince other nations to create and adhere to similar protections. 21 Passage of the DTSA ¶8 The genesis of the DTSA took place over the two Congresses that preceded its passage. Leading the effort were Delaware Senator Christopher Coons and Utah Senator Orrin Hatch. In the 112th Congress, Coons and others introduced the Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, with Wisconsin Senator Herb Kohl giving an introductory statement on the bill. 22 The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it died.
¶9 Two years later, in the 113th Congress, Senators Coons and Hatch introduced the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014. 23 The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which held a hearing on trade secret issues at which this bill was referenced. 24 Ultimately, it met the same fate as its predecessor.
¶10 As often happens today in the U.S. Congress, a parallel effort for trade secret legislation was underway in the 113th Congress's House. First Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on trade secret issues on June 24, 2014. 25 A month later, Representative George Holding and others introduced the Trade Secrets Protection Act. 26 The bill was reported out of committee late in the 113th Congress, with a published report, 27 but no floor action was taken. Despite this House bill's demise, it was resurrected as the foundation and framework on which the DTSA was based, as will be shown below. ¶11 Successful passage of a trade secrets bill was finally achieved with the DTSA, or S. 1890, in the 114th Congress. After its introduction on July 29, 2015, the bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which held a hearing on the legislation in December, amended the legislation, and reported it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, with a published report. 28 After receiving supportive floor statements from Senators Coons, Hatch, and Amy Kobluchar from Minnesota, it passed unanimously, 87-0, on April 4, 2016, was engrossed, and was then referred to the House. 29 ¶12 The House version of the DTSA was introduced on the same day as S. 1890 and contained the same text as the Senate bill. 30 This bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, where it was sidelined as the Senate's DTSA advanced. The committee reported the Senate bill to the House floor, without any amendments but with a report, the text of which was mostly reconstituted and repeated from that of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 31 The bill was advanced to the floor, with supportive statements by Representatives Bob Goodlatte, John Conyers, and others, and passed the House on April 27, 2016, by 412-2. 32 It is tempting, given the lack of House input, to view the DTSA as primarily a Senate initiative. However, again, as will be shown, the basis of much of the DTSA had been drafted in the House's Trade Secrets Protection Act of the previous Congress.
¶13 As legislation goes, the DTSA is eminently manageable. Its substantive provisions involve two key components-the federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation and an ex parte seizure procedure. The first remained relatively consistent throughout the legislation's incarnations over various Congresses. The second was modified over time. To fully understand these provisions, as introduced and finally passed, they must be viewed as the confluence of three other pieces of legislation. Again, the law itself amends and expands the EEA. Its civil cause of action provisions were drawn nearly verbatim from the UTSA. Finally, its civil seizure provisions were cribbed from those found in federal trademark law. The law, at its core components, was dictated by legislative efforts that came before 25 it. The wholesale copying that was performed may have been intended for the law's future interpretation-where statutes are similar or near similar, the one can be used as a guide for the other. 33 ¶14 The DTSA is, and is best understood as, an amendment to the EEA. The EEA emerged in the wave of IP protection legislation that was drafted in the late 1990s. According to a former congressional staff member who testified at the House trade secret hearing in 2014, Congress had originally considered adding a private right of action to the bill that matured into the EEA. Apparently, legislators did not want to include a civil matter in a criminal law bill, and the idea arrived too late to receive full consideration. Drafters thought such a provision might be included in a later bill by a later Congress, but legislators missed that goal as they became preoccupied with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and then patent reform. 34 ¶15 Another major source document for the DTSA is the uniform trade secret law-the UTSA. The UTSA was passed in 1979, after ten years of labor, and over the next several decades it was embraced by the majority of states, though with variations in implementation and interpretation. The DTSA draws from sections 2-5 of the UTSA, which itself is only twelve sections long. As will be shown below, the DTSA cannot be fully understood without reference to both the UTSA and the EEA.
The New Definitions to the EEA ¶16 One of the EEA's key links with the DTSA is the former's existing definitions, which the latter adopts, amends, and adds to. The original list of the EEA's definitions was not particularly long; it included descriptions of the terms "foreign instrumentality, " "foreign agent, " "trade secret, " and "owner. " 35 The DTSA did not add many definitions to this list-including only the terms "misappropriation, " "improper means, " and a reference to the "Trademark Act of 1946"-but its additions did not lack for significance. 36 ¶17 EEA provisions not changed were the definitions of "owner, " "foreign instrumentality, " and "foreign agent. " Of these, the most important is the definition of trade secret owner: "(4) the term 'owner, ' with respect to a trade secret, means the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is reposed. " 37 The EEA's definitions of "foreign agent" and "foreign instrumentality" are not particularly relevant to this discussion, despite the early emphasis on espionage by foreign actors and countries. (3) the term "trade secret" means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public.
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The drafters of the EEA stated that this definition was "largely" based on that of the UTSA, though, unlike DTSA's drafters, they deviated from uniform law's text style. 40 Apparently, the use of the word "public" at the end of the original definition created some confusion with the courts and raised the possibility that there was a "potentially meaningful" distinction between "trade secret" definition in the federal law and the UTSA. 41 ¶19 The DTSA's drafters sought to remedy this problem. The Senate Judiciary Committee struck the word "public" in S. 1890 and added the phrase: "another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of information, " which came from the UTSA's definition. 42 The Senate and House reports note that the intent behind this change was to "bring the Federal definition of a trade secret in conformity with the UTSA's definition. " In making this change, the committees were clear that the definition of the EEA, as amended, was to be the same as that of the UTSA: "While other minor differences between the UTSA and Federal definition of a trade secret remain, the Committee does not intend for the definition of a trade secret to be meaningfully different from the scope of that definition as understood by courts in States that have adopted the UTSA. " 43 ¶20 The most significant new DTSA definitions included were "misappropriation" and "improper means. " 44 The misappropriation definition was drawn from the UTSA, though with some stylistic changes made during the legislative process. By "intentionally" drawing the text directly from the UTSA, the committees that worked on the DTSA were clear that the goal of the new legislation was "not 39 Comm. on the Judiciary and enrolled). Citing to bills in a legislative history narrative can be a challenge where, as was the case in the trade secret protection legislation discussed here, bills are divided by section numbers, which can also include numbers for the U.S. Code section to be amended. To clarify which section numbers are being referred to, the author has adopted Bluebook Rule 12.4(d), which designates bill sections with the abbreviation for section or "sec. " and amendments to the U.S. Code with the section symbol or " §".
43. S. intended to alter the balance of current trade secret law or alter specific court decisions. " 45 The DTSA's drafters also followed the text of the UTSA's definition of "improper means, " with, however, the specific exclusion of "reverse engineering" and "independent derivation" to clarify that neither activity would "constitute improper means. " 46 
¶21
The important relation between the definition provisions of the EEA and the DTSA, and even the UTSA, raises an interesting example of how legislative histories close in topical relation but distant in temporal proximity become interrelated. Just as the UTSA spawned definitions in the EEA that affected what was implemented in the DTSA, a researcher may have to investigate past laws which become incorporated with contemporaneous statutes.
The DTSA's Civil Remedies for Trade Secret Misappropriation ¶22 The declaration of the DTSA's civil remedy is comprised of two componentsthe activity redressable by private parties and the necessary jurisdictional requirement to get such actions into federal court. In both cases, the DTSA's language differs markedly from its previous incarnations in prior Congresses.
¶23 The prior Senate versions of the DTSA in the 112th and 113th Congresses sought to include the EEA's expansive descriptions of industrial espionage and theft of trade secrets as causes of action, along with a more general misappropriation of trade secrets. 47 The drafters in the House took a different approach, making misappropriation of an owner's trade secret solely actionable. 48 Ultimately, the DTSA included the House language. 49 ¶24 The DTSA also deviated from the jurisdictional requirements of one of its prior versions. S. 3389, from the 112th Congress, required that actionable theft of a trade secret be "related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce. " 50 S. 2267 and H.R. 5233, from the 113th Congress, adopted language from the EEA's 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a), extending protection to trade secrets "related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate and foreign commerce. " 51 And this was used in S. 1890. 52 The reason for the switch was that, in 2012, the Second Circuit had held that section 1832(a)'s original language of the EEA, which, again, was the same as S. 3389, should be construed narrowly, allowing a former Goldman Sachs employee to avoid criminal sanctions for theft of the source code to the company's proprietary high-frequency trading system. 53 In response, Congress passed the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, which replaced the phrase "included in a product that is produced for or placed in" with "a product or service used in or intended for use in" to negate the Second Circuit's ruling. 54 ¶25 The civil remedies provisions of S. 3389 from the 112th Congress; S. 2297, H.R. 5233, and H.R. 3326 from the 113th Congress; and S. 1890 and H.R. 3326 from the 114th Congress consistently adopted the intent if not the style of the UTSA. S. 3389 and S. 2297 adopted similar injunctive relief provisions to the UTSA's section 2, allowing courts to grant injunctions to prevent actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation; affirmative action, where appropriate, if necessary to protect the trade secret; and, in exceptional circumstances, where an injunction would be inequitable, a reasonable royalty for the time period in which a use could have been prohibited. 55 S. 1890 included similar provisions "drawn directly" from UTSA's section 2, 56 but with one addition. Some senators had voiced concern that the bill might overrule state laws protecting worker mobility. 57 An employee protection measure had been adopted to restrict injunctive relief from preventing employees from accepting offers of employment. 58 Employee mobility remained a concern, and this change was built on in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The version of S. 1890 reported from that committee now required that any conditions that were imposed on taking new employment had to be related to trade secret misappropriation and not mere personal knowledge. 59 Further, such relief could not conflict with state laws against restraints on the lawful practice of a profession, trade, or business, though, as will be seen, the bill did not limit such additional equitable remedies at the state level. 60 ¶26 The awards provision of the various DTSAs consistently tracked the UTSA's section 3, including damages for actual losses and unjust enrichment or, in lieu of damages, a reasonable royalty. 61 Of these, both the Senate and House committee reports discouraged the use of the royalty remedy, preferring others that would "first, halt misappropriator's use and dissemination of the misappropriated trade secret, and, second, make available appropriate damages. " 62 The committees also noted that state courts viewed the royalty provision as a measure of last resort. 63 53. The court found that the original section 1832(a) did not apply because the trading system was not specifically produced for or placed in commerce. Like the UTSA, the federal bills also included exemplary damages for willful and malicious misappropriation, though the amount changed in each Congress. For S. 3389, from the 112th Congress, it was equal to that for actual losses and unjust enrichment; for S. 2297 and H.R. 5233, both from the 113th Congress, and S. 1890, from the 114th Congress, as introduced, it was three times the amount. 64 S. 1890 was amended in the Senate Judiciary Committee to two times the amount, which is consistent with the UTSA. 65 ¶27 Each legislative effort tracked the UTSA's provision of a prevailing party's attorneys' fees fairly closely and consistently, allowing such remedies where claims of appropriation and motions to terminate were made in bad faith and where a trade secret was willfully and maliciously misappropriated. 66 The Senate Judiciary Committee alleviated evidentiary burdens for parties charging claims of misappropriation were made in bad faith, including language that such accusations could be proven by circumstantial evidence. 67 ¶28 The statute of limitations to bring a claim under the DTSA's bills veered between three and five years over its various versions. S. 3389 originally took the shorter toll. 68 S. 2297, H.R. 5233, and S. 1890, as introduced, took the longer one. 69 The version of S. 1890 reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee reduced the limit to three years, making it identical with that of the UTSA. 70
The DTSA's Ex Parte Seizure ¶29 While the civil action provisions were fairly consistent throughout the legislation's genesis over several Congresses, this was not the case with the ex parte seizure provision, which was changed in style and substance with each introduced bill. This provision has been described as an "Anton Piller" order, a form of prejudgment discovery enabling one party to have the property of another seized for a future action. 71 In the case of trade secrets, the supporters of the trade secret provision argued such a measure was made necessary by the technological ease with which information could be copied and transported across state lines and national boundaries. 72 ¶30 The original Senate incarnation of the trade secret ex parte seizure procedure of S. 3389, from the 112th Congress, was comparatively brief compared to its future versions. It required a complaint describing the "reasonable measures" taken to protect a trade secret and a sworn representation that the dispute involved a need for nationwide service of process or misappropriation of a trade secret to another country. A court, finding clear and convincing evidence that an order was necessary to prevent irreparable harm, could issue an order for the "seizure of any property (including computers) used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of the violation alleged in the civil action" and "the preservation of evidence in the civil action. " 73 The court could have the property retained for seventy-two hours, a time period that could be extended only after the affected party had received notice and a chance to be heard. The court could require the party requesting the order (hereinafter, the applicant) to pay for any copies of the seized property and return seized property after the running of the retention time period and any extensions. 74 Aggrieved parties subject to the seizure could bring a civil action against the applicant for "damages for lost profits, cost of materials, and loss of good will"; punitive damages if the action was brought in bad faith; and reasonable attorneys' fees if the court found extenuating circumstances. 75 ¶31 The 113th Congress's S. 2267 filled out the Senate's planned ex parte seizure procedure. This bill required an applicant to submit an affidavit or a verified complaint to the court. 76 In response, the court could issue appropriate orders to preserve evidence, including making copies of storage media containing the misappropriated trade secret. 77 The bill adopted the requirements of trademark's Lanham Act, requiring that any reference to counterfeit marks be read instead to say "misappropriation of a trade secret. " 78 This essentially made an application require a showing that:
• any other relief but ex parte would be insufficient, • the applicant had not publicized the seizure, • the matter to be seized was at the location identified in the application,
• the applicant would suffer more harm than the seizure would cause if granted, and • the person or persons against whom the order was being made would move or destroy evidence if given notice. 79 If the court found the applicant would suffer irreparable injury, it could issue appropriate orders to mitigate such harm, requiring the preservation of evidenceeven the copying of an "electronic storage medium" that contained trade secret information-and injunctions authorized under the bill's civil remedies provision, e.g. injunctions to prevent actual and threatened trade secret misappropriation. 80 The bill limited orders by requiring that they not allow seizure of property incidental to the misappropriation and that they be crafted, "to the extent possible, . . . not [to] interrupt normal and legitimate business operations unrelated to the trade secret. " 81 A notable omission from the bill was the deletion of the "clear and convincing standard of its predecessor. " 82 ¶32 But it was in the House, also during the 113th Congress, that the ex parte seizure option was fully fleshed out in H.R. 5233, with more limitations than had existed in the Senate legislation in that and prior Congresses. 83 The shift from replicating trademark's ex parte seizure to crafting a modified one, on the record anyway, appears to have resulted from testimony by David M. Simon, Senior Vice President for Intellectual Property at Salesforce.com Inc., before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Committee. Simon warned that basing the trade secret ex parte seizure procedure on one for physical goods, such as with trademark and copyright, was risky. He noted that trade secrets were often in intangible form and commingled with the unrelated information of others, on the computer networks and drives of data hosting services. He claimed that seizing such storage mediums, and holding them for days, would deprive a large number of innocent parties of their own information, destabilizing their businesses. Moreover, he warned that technical knowhow was required on the part of officials undertaking such seizures. Another witness, Thaddeus Burns, Senior Counsel for Intellectual Property and Trade at General Electric, testified on behalf of the Intellectual Property Ownership Association (IPO). Burns was apparently involved in the "discussions" on the legislation and was receptive to Simon's concerns:
[Mr. BURNS] I think when we started having this discussion, all of us were thinking with a Lanham Act headset on, and we know the Lanham Act is really aimed at essentially seizing goods, so you are trying to find the infringing embodiment of a Lacoste shirt, right?
Mr. NADLER. A what?
Mr. BURNS. This is a-a Lacoste shirt, you know, this is a very different environment that we are in. What we are really-our objectives here are really about preserving evidence so that you can have a proceeding on the merits that looks at all the facts and also to prevent further leakage beyond what has already taken place, whether it is in a digital environment or a physical environment. So I fully agree with you, if there is going to be a seizure provision, it needs to be a very narrowly tailored one, something of last resort that is aimed at that bad faith individual who is about to get on a plane, fly to another country with a PIN drive full of confidential data.
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House drafters got the message as well. When trade secret legislation was introduced a month after the hearing; it contained the tailored Lanham Act seizure provisions.
85 ¶33 Under H.R. 5233, an ex parte applicant, through an affidavit or a verified complaint, could obtain the seizure of property necessary "to prevent the propagation or dissemination" of misappropriated trade secrets. 86 The requirements for the order were that it must "clearly appear" from "specific facts" that certain requirements were met. 87 These requirements were mostly from trademark's Lanham Act, but with the provisions now specifically written into the bill instead of being incorporated by reference. 88 The applicant had to show that a traditional order would be inadequate because the party against whom the order would be issued (hereinafter, the defendant) would not comply with traditional injunctive relief. 89 The applicant also had to show that immediate and irreparable injury would occur without the seizure. 90 Harm to the applicant had to outweigh that endured by the defendant and substantially outweigh that endured by any third parties harmed by the seizure. 91 They also had to show that the applicant was "likely to succeed" in showing that a trade secret was involved and that the party subject to the order had misappropriated it and was in possession of it. 92 The application had to describe the matter to be seized with "reasonable particularity" and identify the location of such matter "to the extent reasonable under the circumstances. defendant, or those acting with the defendant, would destroy, conceal, or make "such matter" inaccessible to the court. 94 Finally, the applicant could not have already publicized the seizure. 95 ¶34 Perhaps the most significant deviation from trademark law's seizure provision was the possession requirement. The House Judiciary Committee report's analysis of that particular section strongly suggests that representatives heeded Simon's warnings:
The requirement in subclause (IV) protects third-parties from seizure. For instance, the operator of a server on which another party has stored a misappropriated trade secret, or online an intermediary such as an Internet service provider, would not be subject to seizure because that party did not misappropriate the trade secret. The court may decide to issue an injunction preventing disclosure of the trade secret, but not a seizure order under this provision. 96 Attention to that concern remained a factor in the development of legislation in the subsequent Congress. 97 ¶35 H.R. 5233 also included much greater detail on the elements the order was to contain. Close similarities also existed with the Lanham Act. Courts were to set forth their findings of fact and conclusions of law. 98 They had to direct the seizure's conduct in a manner that would minimize the interruption of third party business operations and, where possible, the legitimate business operations of the party subject to the order that were unrelated to the trade secret. 99 Courts also had to draft an order for protecting against disclosure of the seized property with restrictions on the applicant's access to it, even during the seizure; a prohibition on the making of copies of it; and prevention of undue damage until the defendant had an opportunity to be heard. 100 Courts were to hold a seizure hearing at "the earliest possible" time and no later than seven days after issuance of the order. This was unless the defendant or others harmed by the order consented to another date, though they could not move to dissolve or modify the order until giving notice to the applicant. 101 Any access to the seized property had to be consistent with the provisions governing its custodianship by the court. 102 The applicant was required to provide adequate security for damages that might result from wrongful or "excessive" seizure. 103 Courts were to take measures to restrict any publicity arising from the order. 104 Service of the order was to be made by federal, state, or local law enforcement officers, who would then execute service. 105 Courts were required to secure seized material from "physical and electronic access" during the seizure and while in the court's custody. 106 ¶36 Those who endured damage due to "wrongful or excessive seizure" had recourse to a cause of action against the applicant-the same relief as provided under trademark's Lanham Act § 34(d)(11) or 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11). The aforementioned security posted with the court would not limit recovery of third parties for damages. 107 ¶37 H.R. 5233 as reported from the House Judiciary Committee had few but significant modifications. Foremost amongst these was alteration of the requirement describing against whom the order could be brought, changing the text from a person who "misappropriated the trade secret" to "misappropriated the trade secret by improper means, or conspired to use improper means to misappropriate the trade secret. " 108 This provision includes a curious redundancy since the act defined misappropriation as the acquisition of a trade secret through improper means. The House Judiciary Committee report for the legislation states that this was to prevent ex parte seizure from being used against a party that knew it had acquired a misappropriated trade secret, but did not use or conspire to use "improper means" to obtain it. 109 The clause did allow for seizure where a party was an accomplice to the theft. 110 ¶38 When Congress returned to trade secret legislation the following year, both the House and Senate built on H.R. 5233, with some changes. Both S. 1890 and H.R. 3326 spelled the seizure hearing out in greater detail. At the hearing, the applicant had the burden of proof to show that the order's findings of facts and conclusions of law were still in effect; otherwise the order would be dissolved or modified. 111 The defendant or anyone harmed by an order was empowered to move to dissolve or modify the order at any time after giving notice to the applicant. 112 The court could make such orders modifying the rules of discovery to prevent frustration of the purposes of the hearing. 113 Parties could move, at any time, and even ex parte, to encrypt material stored in an electronic storage medium that had been or would be seized. 114 ¶39 Apparently, Simon's earlier caution about courts grappling with the technical issues of seizing information contained in electronic storage devices was still a concern. The new bills had a provision that material in an "electronic storage medium" was prohibited from being connected to an "electronic network" or the Internet without both parties' consent. This custody was to remain in effect until the seizure hearing. 115 ¶40 The seizure provisions went through significant changes, as well as stylistic ones, in the Senate Judiciary Committee. These were the final alterations to the legislation: none were made on the Senate floor, in the House Judiciary Committee, or on the House floor. First, phrasing was included that this ex parte relief could be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances. " 116 This was in keeping with statements made at a hearing in which senators and witnesses affirmed that this remedy was limited and controlled and available only as a last resort. 117 Reference was also made in the Senate and House reports on the legislation, documenting the rare instances in which such a procedure should be used:
For example, this authority is not available if an injunction under existing rules of civil procedure would be sufficient. The ex parte seizure provision is expected to be used in instances in which a defendant is seeking to flee the country or planning to disclose the trade secret to a third party immediately or is otherwise not amenable to the enforcement of the court's orders. 118 ¶41 In the provision requiring the narrowest seizure possible, the phrase requiring that legitimate business operations of the defendant "that are unrelated to the trade secret that allegedly has been misappropriated" was deleted. 119 Access to seized material in court custody, by either the applicant or defendant, was now prohibited instead of restricted, until parties had an opportunity to be heard in court. 120 In fashioning their seizure orders, court had to provide guidance to law enforcement authorities, delineating their authority, including the hours that a seizure could be executed and whether force could be used to access locked areas. 121 ¶42 Seizures were now to be conducted specifically by federal law enforcement officers, though state and local officers could participate in such actions. 122 In addition, law enforcement could request assistance from technical experts, unaffiliated with the applicant and bound by a nondisclosure agreement, if the court found such participation would aid "efficient execution" and "minimize the burden of seizure. " 123 Applicants and their agents were to be specifically excluded from such raids. 124 The custody provisions now included empowerment to courts to appoint special masters, bound by nondisclosure agreements, who were charged with locating and isolating misappropriated trade secret information and facilitating unrelated property and data to those from whom it had been seized. 125 Civil Cause of Action Rule of Construction ¶43 A "rule of construction" statement attached to the section containing the civil cause of action remained the same throughout the DTSA's predecessors and its form throughout passage: "Nothing in the amendments made by this section shall be construed to modify the rule of construction under section 1838 of title 18, United States Code, or to preempt any other provision of law. " 126 The section it refers to is the construction with other laws provision of the EEA, which states that the EEA does not preempt or displace civil remedies of federal and state laws. 127 According to the Senate and House reports, the result of this rule is that "State trade secret laws are not preempted or affected by this Act. " Nor did it affect "otherwise lawful disclosures" under the Freedom of Information Act. 128
Additional DTSA Amendments to the EEA ¶44 Besides its most salient provisions, the DTSA version that emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee had other changes. It now had modifications for the criminal provisions of the EEA, changing the computation that could be levied for criminal violations from $5 million to the greater of $5 million or "three times the value of the stolen trade secret" to an "organization, " including "expenses for research and design and other costs that the organization has thereby avoided. " 129 The term "organization" is derived from the EEA. While not specifically defined in the law, the intent behind its use appears to distinguish corporate or group entities from individuals and natural persons. 130 ¶45 The bill also included a new subsection that forbade courts from directing an owner from disclosing material claimed to be a trade secret unless the owner was allowed to file a sealed submission describing the owner's interest in the material and its interest in keeping it confidential. 131 This subsection to the prosecutors or the court did not waive trade secret protection without consent of the owner. According to the committees, part of the rationale behind this language was to deny trade secret disclosure to defendants because "the actual secrecy of information that is the object of the conspiracy is not relevant to the prosecution of a conspiracy charge. " 132 Finally, language was added to make economic espionage and theft of trade secrets "predicate offenses" under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 133 ¶46 One provision that affected both the criminal-focused EEA and the civil provisions of the DTSA was the exemption for disclosures of trade secrets in certain legal proceedings. Individuals making confidential trade secret disclosures to report a violation or suspected violation of laws, to federal, state, and local law enforcement officials and attorneys, were immunized from liability. 134 Disclosures in a case's pleadings were also immunized so long as these were made under seal. 135 Individuals who filed a lawsuit against an employer who had retaliated for such disclosures could disclose the trade secret to an attorney as long as documents containing it were filed under seal and did not disclose the secret save in order to comply with a court order. 136 Notice of this immunity was required to be provided to employees, either in employment contracts governing trade secrets or by referencing another policy document. 137 Employers failing to do so could not receive the act's exemplary damages or attorneys' fees against employees who did receive such notice. Under the definition of this section, employees included contractors and consultants. 138 The committees were emphatic that this immunity did not extend to other illegal acts: "The Committee stresses that this provision immunizes the act of disclosure in the limited circumstances set forth in the provision itself; it does not immunizes [sic] acts that are otherwise prohibited by law, such as the unlawful access of material by unauthorized means. " 139 Additional Provisions ¶47 The act, from the reported version of H.R. 5233 to S. 1890, also provided for the other branches of government to produce information related to trade secret theft and protection. The attorney general, in consultation with the IP enforcement coordinator, the director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and "heads of other appropriate agencies, " was to produce a biennial report on international trade secret theft. 140 The Federal Judicial Center was charged with producing best practices for the seizure, storage, and security of information as required by the new law. 141 ¶48 The drafters of S. 1890 also included a "sense of Congress" statement with the bill. Sense statements, unlike purpose statements, are not imperative or enforceable. They express Congress's "desire" as to how a law should be interpreted. 142 S. 1890 also included other provisions not included in the prior bills. It included a statement that the law was "not to be construed as a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any other Act of Congress"-that is, copyright, patent and trademark law. 143 Finally, the new legislation made minor alterations to the style of the code, for example, renaming section 1836 of title 18 "Civil Proceedings. " 144 A New Use for Legislative History ¶49 This is, no doubt, an inopportune moment to declare that writing a legislative history narrative of the DTSA is not the primary purpose of this article. The lead goal is to suggest a new way to use legislative history. Although the process of documenting a law's passage differs little from Elizabeth Finley's description in 1946, 145 the ease with which we collect, organize, and disseminate this information has changed significantly. 146 At the same time, law librarians have come to face an urgent need to prove their own utility amid shrinking budgets and improved technology. They must show that they are "thought leaders in legal information, " in part by demonstrating to the "legal community" that they are the "recognized experts" in that field. 147 The "new use" of legislative history proposed combines this long-standing law librarian skill and the digital availability of legislative information to combat the profession's current existential threat-suggesting that law librarians actively leverage and market their knowledge and abilities in legislative history by making and publicizing legislative histories contemporaneously with a bill's passage into law.
¶50 Of course, law librarians have plentiful and varied tools in their skill sets, but significant factors advance legislative history as a leading candidate for promotion. Legislative history retains significant importance to the study and practice of law. Obviously, legislative history's role in statutory interpretation remains controversial and has its detractors, but its use is widespread in the courts, academe, and practice. 148 More important, just as in Finley's day, few if any inhabitants of the legal field wish to perform legislative history research. Lawyers are often daunted by the prospect of compiling a legislative history, and usually they forward the work to associates or interns who, if they are smart, ask for help from a law librarian. 149 Academics routinely thank law librarians in their articles' footnotes for performing legislative history research, suggesting they are not too keen on performing the practice either. 150 Rare are law students who are excited to do legislative histories, and those who are will likely be applying to library school to become law librarians themselves. 151 Legislative history is the domain of the law librarian almost by default.
¶51 Nor are digital nor online tools likely to change this state of affairs, at least not any time soon. The information age has made many formerly laborious research tasks much easier, but legislative history research steadfastly defies such 148. To investigate this claim, I ran a Lexis Advance search of federal court cases since January 1, 2017, that included the phrase: "legislative history" and retrieved almost 1000 hits. I ran the same search in law reviews and retrieved more than 1100 hits. When I ran this search in Legal News, I retrieved nearly 2500 hits. Even discounting roughly two-thirds of those as being related to tax issues, it is conceivable the remainder have significant potential coverage of legislative history. These searches are no replacement for a scientific study, of course, but they do show a significant and widespread interest in, if not practice of, legislative history in the legal field today.
149 153 While the legal profession as a whole frets over the possibility of automated lawyering, the inability of digital tools to fully capture legislative history shows we're still far, far away from automated legislative history research, if that is even possible. 154 ¶52 Because legislative history retains its importance, few other legal professionals can or will "do" it, and it cannot be "Googled" on any database, such research still falls to law librarians, as does teaching the basics of how to perform it. This state of affairs renders legislative history as a platform through which law librarians can "assert their value in a meaningful way. " 155 The operative word in that phrase is "assert. " It is not enough that law librarians know legislative history; they must be known to know legislative history. 156 A simple means of achieving this goal is to generate and make available legislative histories, with narratives explaining them, when bills pass rather than passively awaiting a patron request to do so. If someone, somewhere, is going to need a legislative history of a law at some point, why not anticipate that need and meet it instantaneously when it appears? 157 Why not make that legislative history available through a journal such as this one, a law library webpage, or other similar venues for research? Doing so would advertise the utility of law librarians in documenting and generating this important information. This use of legislative histories help could usher in a new law library mission for the digital age-a "broader conception of community service, " which public libraries have embraced already and was recently called for in the pages of this journal. 158 ¶53 These are not mere academic observations. This legislative history of the DTSA was compiled during the law's passage to test whether the contemporaneous legislative history approach would actually yield the benefits described above. The history was then made available through a research guide containing the law's legislative history resources and a draft paper on its legislative path that was posted on SSRN shortly after the law was passed in April 2016. 159 Two leading IP blogs and one practitioner were then alerted to the existence of this information. 160 To date, the research guide has received almost 1000 hits. 161 The SSRN narrative, as of this writing, had more than 200 downloads and for two weeks in May 2016 was in the top ten SSRN articles downloaded in the "Private Law-Intellectual Property" category. 162 Finally, one of the IP blogs, contacted about the DTSA legislative history, invited the author to write a blog post on the topic. 163 If these results could be achieved with such limited promotion, certainly far greater success could be obtained through more diligent and aggressive publicity.
¶54 How does one compile a contemporaneous legislative history? The process is not much different than that for a traditional legislative history. The most significant challenge is in choosing which bills to follow. Thousands of bills are introduced in each Congress, and only a fraction of these ever become law. How is a law librarian to know which ones will mature into legislation? Do law librarians need to rigorously monitor Congress or have some seer-like ability to make a contemporaneous legislative history? Gut instinct and mild current awareness will give an answer where math, and even analytics, cannot-or, at least, cannot yet. Some bills can be described as "most likely to pass, " if not "must pass. " A prime example is the revision of copyright law now underway. Most commentators, experts, and ordinary people acknowledge that the current law, passed in 1976, is woefully inadequate to the digital age. Congress has already begun work on a new law, and one will probably pass, conceivably within this or the next decade. 164 Then there are bills that are merely likely to pass, bills that enjoy bipartisan support (yes, that still does happen on occasion) and move through Congress with sufficient speed to reach a final vote before the end of a session. For example, the 114th Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act, potentially far-reaching legislation dealing with pharmaceutical drugs, medical devices, mental health, and diseases. 165 Other candidates for contemporaneous legislative history will not be known until the session progresses and legislative priorities of the House and Senate, as well as the potential of getting presidential approval, are made known or political exigencies demand. For example, both parties agree that a reform of the tax code is desirable, though, at the writing of this article, significant inter-and intraparty differences remain in both chambers. 166 Even if a bill being researched fails to become law, as most bills do, the record of a contemporaneous history will prove helpful to future researchers in law, history, and political science as an illustrative lesson of how the legislative process does, and does not, work. At the time of writing this article, the GOP-controlled Senate of the 115th Congress was enduring multiple obstacles in its attempt to "repeal and replace" the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 167 Should the effort collapse, the significance of this failure will certainly have some bearing on any future healthcare bills.
¶55 The researcher's temporal relationship to traditional and contemporaneous legislative history presents another distinction between the two forms. With a traditional legislative history, the researcher traces the legislative process backward through time to acquire a record of sources. A contemporaneous legislative history follows the process as it moves forward, requiring the researcher to monitor the creation of sources and to incorporate them into a history after they are made available. Key to a contemporaneous legislative history, and absent from a traditional one, is the researcher's need to monitor congressional activity, which can operate at a glacial pace at one moment, and frenetically at another. A variety of online services, many of them free, now exist to alert researchers to bills as they are introduced and keep them apprised as the legislation moves through the legislative process-for example, GovTrack.us, the Sunlight Foundation's Scout, and Congress .gov. Lexis Advance and Westlaw have bill tracking features as well. However, the contemporaneous legislative history researcher cannot rely exclusively on such services, as a bill's path toward passage is often not a single or a linear path, and sometimes is even a shell game. Often, a legislative initiative is not the product of a single bill. Numerous bills can be introduced to deal with a certain subject. Of these, the House and Senate may choose to work on their own versions so that two separate bills are proceeding through consideration at the same time. The chambers might advance the work of one or swap the work that emerged from the other chamber with its own. Add to this tendency the possibility that separate bills may deal with a fractional element of a topic and then be rolled into larger legislation, even an omnibus bill that deals with many matters. Researchers can track all these legislative pieces by monitoring traditional news media or, better still, subscribing to news alerts (from Bloomberg BNA, for example).
¶56 Contemporaneous legislative history may not be for every law librarian or every law library. However, this practice does illustrate the tactics that both will need to demonstrate their continued importance-the leveraging of their formidable legal information skills and resources, the anticipation of future patron needs, and the development of innovative services. Contemporaneous legislative history itself will predict the tasks that law librarians need to achieve to secure the future of their profession. ¶57 What is clear from the DTSA's legislative history source documents is the direction Congress intended to go-a uniform civil cause of action for trade secrets misappropriation. Congress provided a guide as to the goals the DTSA was intended to achieve. And it did so with a remarkable degree of unanimity for a body that is not currently known for being able to achieve consensus. This broad agreement is evidenced not only in the actual votes to pass it but in the marked similarity between the bills and committee reports, in both chambers. In few pieces of legislation has Congress spoken so clearly and unitedly. Beyond its purpose, the DTSA is a direct counter to the idea that legislative history cannot express the will of a chamber or a Congress. 168 ¶58 What is not clear is how the desired uniformity will be achieved. The UTSA itself has been implemented differently by different state legislatures and interpreted differently by different state courts. Federal district and appellate courts will draw on that diversity as they grapple with the new federal law. It is conceivable that the legislative histories of the UTSA and state implementations of it could merge, creating diverse research trails to follow while untangling issues raised by the DTSA's interpretation. Congress may have set the objective, but the federal courts will have to figure out how to get there.
Conclusion
¶59 What is certain is that shifting congressional trends and uncertain legislative outcomes create opportunities for law librarians to proclaim their definite value: by using legislative histories to report on how Congress conducts its business and to organize and deliver information to assist legal practitioners and academics to interpret its laws. In this way, law librarians prove their knowledge in a specific and important aspect of legal information-just one "niche, " as former Law Librarian of Congress David Mao described, that expresses how law librarians bring value to their institutions, the legal community, and the civil society at large. 169 168. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 29-37 (1997). 169. Gorham & Jaeger, supra note 158, at 66, ¶ 42.
